The following article was originally published at Palestine Today and Quds News.

The question of the role of Palestinian capitalism is not merely a question of wealth, or of “businessmen” who have amassed enormous profits in a society suffering under occupation. Before anything else, it is a question about the nature of the authority that emerged under colonialism, the social forces that benefited from the continuation of economic and political dependency, and the manner in which the interests of a limited group were transformed into an integrated system of institutions, privileges and relationships that is difficult to change through conventional political means. The difficulty of changing and reforming the so-called “Palestinian political system” lies in the existence of a stratum that collaborates with the enemy and cannot be made to relinquish its privileges unless it is replaced by a popular authority possessing its own alternative revolutionary project. This is a task that will not be accomplished through sham elections under occupation, but rather requires conditions of an entirely different kind.

For decades, the Palestinian people have suffered the confiscation of their land and resources, the destruction of the foundations of production, and the imposition of economic dependency on the Israeli occupation. However, this process has not produced only poverty, unemployment and displacement. It has also contributed to the emergence of Palestinian economic strata that have been able to generate profits from within these very relationships of dependency. This is a stratum that will defend its position with all the power at its disposal, through the system of repression and corruption known as the “Palestinian Authority.”

Herein lies the fundamental contradiction: What constitutes an existential and economic crisis for the Palestinian majority becomes a source of profit and influence for a minority that monopolizes commercial intermediation, privileges and resources — and consequently monopolizes political decision-making. Whenever an attempt is made to strip this class of its role, it seeks the protection of the Zionist enemy, rushes to its side, and obstructs the process of internal change through “presidential decrees.” Mahmoud Abbas is merely a servant of Europe and the Saudi regime, and represents this class of parasites.

This minority is not simply a group of wealthy individuals. Rather, some of its components can be understood as a comprador stratum — that is, a capitalist group that derives an essential part of its power from its connection to the dominant external economy and from its role as an agent or intermediary between that economy and the local market, instead of developing an independent national productive base. It would be a mistake to equate all Palestinian owners of capital with this stratum. The owners of factories and small and medium-sized enterprises also suffer enormous losses as a result of the occupation, and their immediate interests may conflict with the economy of monopoly and dependency.

Palestinian parasitic capitalism did not emerge with the Oslo Accords, but the period that followed provided new conditions for the expansion of its influence.

The Palestinian Authority was established in the absence of sovereignty over borders, natural resources and foreign trade, while economic relations remained governed by the 1994 Paris Economic Protocol, which tied essential sectors of the Palestinian economy to the Israeli system. In this environment, access to commercial privileges, licenses, public contracts and external financing became an important source of economic power. Over time, intertwined relationships developed among major capitalists, political officials and public institutions. They all agreed that the officers of the occupation constituted their ultimate authority. The problem was no longer confined to individual cases of corruption, but extended to the very nature of the relationship between political authority and capital. More precisely, it is a relationship with the enemy: There is a class alliance within the “Authority areas” that is allied, primarily economically, with the enemy entity, and “security coordination” is merely one manifestation of this relationship between them.

When major economic opportunities become tied to proximity to centers of decision-making, and when commercial interests overlap with political functions, a structure emerges that is capable of reproducing itself regardless of the degree of popular satisfaction with it. This structure is protected, first and foremost, by the occupation. Accordingly, the Zionist enemy can reproduce the Palestinian Authority while preserving its essential function, which has characterized it since the Oslo Accords.

The danger posed by this stratum lies in the fact that its interests are not limited to generating profits from trade, services or financial intermediation. The continuation of its profits also depends on the continuation of the political and legal environment that allows it to maintain its position. Thus, the relationship between wealth and power becomes a closed circle: The Authority grants privileges and opportunities, while capital networks provide economic resources and social influence that contribute to consolidating the existing system. This explains how poverty is rampant throughout the West Bank while billions of dollars accumulate in the pockets of the one percent belonging to the “economic peace” camp!

As this relationship expands, political change becomes a direct threat to accumulated economic interests. Political competition is no longer merely a disagreement over programs and leadership, but becomes a struggle over the distribution of resources, the institutions that control them, and the broad network of those who benefit from them. From this perspective, the thwarting of change can be understood as a class phenomenon, rather than simply the determination of individuals to cling to their positions.

How Does the Capitalist Class Obstruct the Mechanisms of Change?

Allied economic and political elites can weaken the prospects for change through a series of interconnected mechanisms.

The first is control over economic resources, which makes opportunities for employment, investment and contracts dependent, to varying degrees, on centers of influence, and limits the ability of independent social groups to build their own institutions. The second is the weakening of oversight and accountability, as mutual interests between certain officials and owners of capital become obstacles to transparency and fair competition. The third is the reshaping of the public sphere, through the declining independence of representative, trade-union and professional institutions, or the diminishing ability of these institutions to express the interests of workers and popular classes independently of political and economic polarization.

The fourth mechanism is the transformation of economic dependency into social dependency. A society in which a large proportion of the population depends on salaries, transfers and assistance, amid declining production and rising unemployment, becomes more vulnerable to crises resulting from the withholding of revenues or the interruption of funding. This dependency not only undermines society’s ability to protest or organize, but also raises the social cost of change or action. Merely writing a post on social media or attending a condolence gathering for a martyr can cost an activist six months in administrative detention.

This structure cannot be understood without examining the position of the Israeli occupation as the principal dominant power controlling the land, borders, resources and economic activity. The occupation is not merely an external factor influencing the Palestinian economy; rather, it imposes a large part of the conditions under which that economy operates and restricts the possibilities for independent development and production.

At the same time, the system of international funding and assistance has contributed to shaping the priorities of the Authority’s institutions by supporting programs and projects whose objectives, conditions and social consequences vary. This does not mean that all foreign assistance is harmful, or that all donors operate according to a single political objective. However, chronic dependence on external funding, in the absence of economic sovereignty, gives funding bodies influence over public policies and limits the independence of decision-making.

Why Is It So Difficult to Uproot This System Through the Illusion of Elections?

It is difficult to uproot because it is no longer merely an economic class that possesses wealth, but has become part of a broad network of interests, institutions, and social and political relationships. This is also because change, in this case, is not a matter of replacing one official with another, but of reconsidering the rules governing the distribution of power and wealth, the mechanisms of decision-making, the relationship between the Authority and society, and the nature of the economy that is to be built. Replacing individual faces while preserving monopolies, privileges and economic dependency will not change the essence of the system. It may instead lead to its reproduction under new names and slogans.

Therefore, any serious project of reform and liberation requires the building of a clandestine revolutionary movement that threatens the interests of this class, and an underground armed force that threatens the occupation, accompanied by a process of building genuine popular institutions, restoring the importance of trade-union organizing, organizational frameworks and social bases, combating monopolies, supporting productive sectors, and expanding popular participation in confronting both the occupation and economic policies simultaneously. This makes clear why the liberation struggle has become even more difficult with the existence of the “Authority”!

The Palestinian experience reveals that completely separating national liberation from social justice leads to an incomplete understanding of the nature of the struggle.

It is impossible to build a national economy under colonial control of the land and resources, just as it is difficult to build a broad and effective national liberation movement when large sectors of society suffer from economic marginalization and exclusion from decision-making.

However, linking these two questions does not mean that every social contradiction is equivalent to the contradiction with the occupation, or that all Palestinian economic forces play the same role. Rather, it means recognizing how class interests within a society intersect with the colonial structure, and how certain elites can benefit from the continuation of the status quo while the popular majority bears its economic, social and political costs.

The occupation has contributed to destroying the Palestinian productive base and imposing long-term economic dependency. Within this structure, specific capitalist strata have been able to expand their interests and establish close relationships with centers of power. Poverty — impoverishment — has been deliberately engineered, the workers’, women’s and student movements have been destroyed, and the role of these forces, which are capable of organizing and leading society, as we saw during the Great Popular Intifada of 1987, has been usurped.

Reducing the crisis of the “Palestinian political system” to administrative corruption, the mistakes of leaders, the failure of the factions to act, or Mahmoud Abbas’s moods obscures a fundamental dimension of the problem. The deeper question concerns who owns the resources, who decides how they are distributed, who benefits from the continuation of dependency, and how economic interests are transformed into political influence capable of obstructing accountability and change.