Is a “Soft War” Being Waged Against Palestinians in Lebanon to Push Them Toward Emigration?
Ahmed al-Sabbahi
The following article was originally published at the Camps Post website in Arabic:
When Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas visited Lebanon in May 2025, he brushed aside the state of Palestinian consensus in Lebanon regarding how to deal with the issue of Palestinian weapons. This issue had long been a Lebanese demand, rising and falling according to the country’s political developments. Abbas announced that Fatah and the Palestinian Authority would hand over the weapons, which led to pressure being exerted on Palestinian resistance movements to surrender their arms, despite the fact that these movements in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon do not possess heavy weaponry.
This was accompanied by statements made by Lebanese officials, foremost among them the head of the Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Amb. Ramez Dimashkieh, following meetings held with the “envoy” of the Palestinian Authority president, Yasser Abbas. These statements claimed that handing over the weapons would be met with changes to Lebanese laws and official procedures that would facilitate the work and daily life of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
However, despite the multiple batches of weapons handed over by Fatah’s “National Security” forces to the Lebanese army, the situation has remained unchanged. Nothing improved in the legal status of Palestinian refugees; on the contrary, Palestinians were surprised by additional measures that further restricted their livelihoods in Lebanon and complicated their legal affairs. It was as though the Palestinian Authority had handed over these weapons without any benefit reflected back to the Palestinian refugees, instead raising unanswered questions about whether this decision was made under external directives—as Palestinian alliance factions and refugees in Lebanon continue to ask.
Unprecedented Measures Squeezing the Camps
In recent times, the Lebanese authorities have resorted to tightening measures at checkpoints surrounding Palestinian camps, particularly Ain al-Hilweh and Rashidieh camps in southern Lebanon. This has obstructed the daily life of refugees. The Lebanese army has not limited itself to checking identity cards at entry and exit points but has intensified inspection procedures at the entrances to Ain al-Hilweh camp, including searches of vehicles and pedestrians, going so far as to inspect milk cartons. One journalist was subjected to interrogation by Lebanese military intelligence after presenting photographs documenting this incident, which were later published in the media.
Subsequently, Beddawi camp was subjected to unprecedented measures, as the Lebanese army closed 23 secondary entrances to the camp. Despite demonstrations, sit-ins, and efforts by Palestinian factions to meet with the Lebanese army, nothing changed. On the contrary, the army recently informed Palestinian factions of its intention to install checkpoints at the two remaining entrances.
Palestinian refugees in Beddawi suffered direct repercussions from these closures, which affected commercial activity inside the camp. Many shops and businesses closed, and social interaction with areas outside the camp was disrupted. The matter did not stop there: these measures also affected employees and students, placing additional economic burdens on families, who were forced to register their children in buses to reach their schools after they had previously been able to walk due to proximity.
Notably, Lebanese military intelligence summoned Palestinian journalists from Beddawi camp who had published video reports on the protest demonstrations against the closures. They were subjected to interrogation and warnings, prompting intervention by the Palestinian factions. The message was clear: peaceful protest is unacceptable, and media coverage is also prohibited.
Nahr al-Bared camp likewise witnessed new measures at Lebanese army checkpoints, including the searching of women by female army personnel.
As for Rashidieh camp, the Lebanese army has constructed military towers inside the camp, and according to available information, these towers will number seven around its perimeter.
The bitter irony is that these latest measures coincided with a sudden and unannounced visit to Burj al-Shamali and Ain al-Hilweh camps by Palestinian Ambassador Mohammed al-Asaad and Major General Bahri al-Abd Ibrahim of the Palestinian Authority. This sparked popular reactions questioning why the visit was not announced in advance, the usefulness of such visits amid heightened restrictions, and why the officials did not meet residents or examine their conditions firsthand.
UNRWA Cutbacks and the Targeting of National Identity
All of these measures are taking place alongside cutbacks to UNRWA’s educational services. Teachers’ salaries and working hours have been reduced, leading to sit-ins and strikes called by the Teachers’ Union, including strikes during the last two class periods in most schools. This moment rang alarm bells over potential cuts that could extend to the complete dismantling of education, in addition to reductions in health services, social assistance, and financial aid.
These cutbacks triggered popular mobilizations and raised questions about the role of Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini. Hakam Shahwan (former head of the Staff Union and UNRWA Director-General in Lebanon between 2016 and 2017) accused Lazzarini of being “committed to dismantling UNRWA from within, even in the final weeks before the end of his six-year term, which was filled with sabotage and destruction.”
These accusations are not far removed from the questions raised by Palestinian refugees and leaders regarding the role of UNRWA’s Director of Affairs in Lebanon, Dorothee Klaus, and her role in suppressing any expression of Palestinian identity, whether flags or maps on clothing, under the pretext of “neutrality.” This includes intensified surveillance under threat of dismissal for anyone who posts or records a stance on social media supporting the struggle or resistance of the Palestinian people, under the pretext of “cutting international funding.” Questions have also been raised about her meetings with security officials and the summoning of Palestinian activists for interrogation after they raised issues related to UNRWA’s role and practices.
Nevertheless, popular and student mobilizations have demonstrated a spirit of defiance and adherence to national identity, sending a clear message to UNRWA and to the United States and Israel that national identity is a red line—a message expressed forcefully by the new generation of Palestinian camp residents.
Fatah Turns UNRWA’s Approach into a Political Confrontation
It was striking that Yasser Abbas, the Palestinian embassy in Lebanon, Fatah, its media outlets, and journalists aligned with them turned the issue of fiercely defending UNRWA into a political confrontation with refugees and alliance factions. In reality, this is a social and political struggle that serves the goal of preserving and supporting UNRWA, without covering up cutbacks, dismissals, or the targeting of Palestinian national identity. Instead of engaging in a unified struggle, the Palestinian Authority has created an unjustified rift in Palestinian consensus in Lebanon.
Media visits by Yasser Abbas to Klaus, and the accompanying statements “supporting UNRWA’s work,” along with public criticism by Fatah officials and their affiliates branding protesters and sit-in participants as “suspicious,” and the unjustified defense that UNRWA is fulfilling its duties, were met with widespread rejection by refugees. This was clearly reflected on social media, particularly in Fatah’s coordinated media discourse claiming that conditions in the camps are good and that UNRWA provides adequate services. Some Lebanese writers even engaged in propaganda suggesting that Fatah’s handover of weapons led to economic relief for Palestinian refugees: claims contradicted by reality.
The Palestinian Authority’s representatives in Lebanon did not stop at media propaganda; they also called for demonstrations in downtown Beirut under the banner of supporting UNRWA. These demonstrations were boycotted by alliance factions and Palestinian media outlets, which view the Authority’s practices as incompatible with the interests of Palestinian refugees and as an attempt to cover up UNRWA’s failures and practices.
This does not negate the fact that UNRWA is facing U.S., European, and even Arab, financial pressure. However, this is not the responsibility of Palestinian refugees, particularly after UNRWA’s mandate was renewed for three years until 30 June 2029, with overwhelming support from 151 states. In light of this broad international backing, UNRWA must exhaust every means to secure funding.
Conclusion
What is taking place constitutes practices that narrow the space of normal life for Palestinians. With their health and their children’s education threatened by UNRWA’s cutbacks, refugees increasingly believe that these policies are deliberate, aimed at pushing Palestinians toward emigration in order to undermine the right of return. Alternatively, they may reflect policies imposed on Lebanon under pressure, potentially leading to the resettlement of some Palestinians and the expulsion of others through restriction and tightening measures.
This places a responsibility on Palestinian political forces to be fully alert and to play the required role in strengthening Palestinian presence, in the face of calls for emigration that remain muted for now but will inevitably grow louder if no serious action is taken.